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The decision to launch EMU has focused attention on possible asymmetries in output and
prices responses to the single monetary policy across EU countries. Unfortunately, the
numerous attempts to establish the extent of such asymmetries in the context of empirical
macroeconomic models have not provided a consistent and robust picture of cross-country
differences in monetary transmission and they are affected by methodological problems. This
state of affairs has revamped interest in microeconomic studies comparing economic and
financial structures across countries, as these are ultimately responsible for any differences in
the way monetary impulses are transmitted throughout the economy.
This study takes stock of the insights and the empirical evidence from this latter strand of
research, and discusses the possible evolution of economic and financial structures in EMU.
The main aim of the study is to shed some light on how each channel of transmission may
work differently in different countries and how this is being changed by the introduction of
the euro.
The analysis indicates that the structural differences across the six euro area countries
considered (Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands) are of a lesser scale
than those between them and the UK or Sweden. Although this does not reveal in which
group of countries monetary policy will have an overall stronger impact on output, it suggests
that the mechanisms at work probably differ between the two groups.
Looking ahead, it seems likely that asymmetries in monetary transmission within the euro
area could reduce over time as financial structures become more similar and economic agents
adjust their behaviour to the new policy environment. In spite of the completion of the Single
Market and the introduction of the euro, however, countries will continue to differ along
many important dimensions - including, for instance, production structures, housing markets,
labour markets, legal systems – implying that a degree of heterogeneity in monetary
transmission will be a persistent feature of the euro area.6
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Massimo Suardi *
1. Introduction1
The decision to launch EMU has prompted a large literature examining potential differences
in prices and output responses to monetary policy across EU countries. Establishing the
extent of such differences is important because with heterogeneous cross-country responses
the single monetary policy itself could induce idiosyncratic business cycles across euro area
countries. Moreover, asymmetries in monetary transmission are likely to be more pronounced
during the early years of the euro, when the potential for convergence in economic and
financial structures is still to a large extent unrealised and economic agents have not yet fully
adapted their behaviour to the new policy regime. It is sometimes objected that regional
differences in monetary transmission in other large monetary unions, such as the US or large
EU economies, have not attracted much attention in the past. However, the case of the euro
area is fundamentally different from these examples, in that the former is not a single political
entity but a union of independent countries which retain responsibility for non-monetary
economic policies.
The recent empirical literature on asymmetries in monetary transmission can be broadly
classified into two main strands, according to their respective focus on the macro- or the
micro-economic level. A number of macroeconomic studies have tried to determine the
extent of asymmetries in monetary transmission using a variety of econometric models and
techniques. Unfortunately, so far these studies have failed to provide a consistent and robust
picture of cross-country differences and they are riddled with methodological problems
(Kieler and Saarenheimo, 1998; Guiso et al., 1999). More recently, this state of affairs has
revamped interest in microeconomic studies which focus on the role of economic and
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financial structures in monetary transmission. Often these studies have concentrated on a
single country or on a particular paradigm of transmission, although some works are of a
more comprehensive nature.
This study takes stock of the insights and the empirical evidence from this latter strand of
research, and discusses the possible evolution of economic and financial structures in EMU.
As in most of the literature, the focus is on asymmetries in the response of output to monetary
policy. The issues related to applying a single monetary policy to countries at different stages
in the business cycle are beyond the scope of this paper.
The analysis is structured around the standard taxonomy of transmission channels: the
interest rate, the exchange rate and credit. The credit channel is treated separately although it
should be seen as “… a set of factors that amplify and propagate conventional interest rate
effects” rather than as a transmission channel in itself (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995)2.T a b l e1
summarises the theoretical framework. Sections 2 and 3 present cross-country data on the
variables which monetary theory suggests to be relevant for monetary transmission. The eight
countries considered are: Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden
and the United Kingdom, i.e. six euro area countries plus two potential future participants in
the euro.
The main aim of the study is to shed some light on how each channel of transmission may
work differently in different countries and how this is being changed by the introduction of
the euro. On the other hand, the essentially descriptive analysis of economic and financial
structures in Sections 2 and 3 is not suited to rank countries according to the overall effect of
monetary policy. This is because different aggregate output and inflation responses to
monetary policy can arise because companies and individuals behave differently in each
country and/or because the mix of these agents differ across countries. Clearly, Sections 2
and 3 only deal with the latter aspect. Section 4 concludes.
2 Economists maintain widely divergent opinions concerning the mechanisms, the timing and the strength
with which monetary policy affects inflation and output (Mishkin, 1995, and articles therein). In the case of
the euro area, the uncertainty is compounded by the fact that this is a new economic entity, with still partly
unsatisfactory aggregate statistics and in which the regime change implied by the introduction of the euro
may have invalidated previous empirical relationships. The higher uncertainty faced by the ECB is put
forward as an important rationale for its eclectic and flexible monetary policy strategy (ECB, 2000 and
2001).8
Table 1: Main determinants of the transmission of monetary policy to output
Interest rate channel
Interest rate pass-through A quicker and fuller pass-through from policy interest rates to market and
bank lending rates increases the power of transmission.
Interest sensitivity of
production
A higher share of interest-sensitive sectors in GDP strengthens the effect of
monetary policy.
Price and wage rigidity The more nominal price and wages are rigid, the larger the impact of any
given demand fall on output. Real rigidities magnify the effect of nominal
rigidities.
Income effect The impact of higher interest rate on disposable income depends on
households’ debt position, the maturity of their interest-bearing assets and
liabilities, as well as the pass-through from policy interest rates to average
interest rates.
Wealth effect The wealth effect on consumption will be stronger in countries where
households’ wealth is large and held in the form of assets with volatile prices.
Given the weight of real assets in total wealth, the size and speed of the
response of real estate prices to interest rate changes is also crucial.
Exchange rate channel
Openness to trade More open economies experience a stronger reduction in output from a real
exchange rate appreciation. In these economies, however, the exchange rate
will also have a comparatively larger impact on prices (a positive terms of
trade effect), and exports may have a higher import content.
Credit view: Bank lending channel
Impact of monetary policy
on loan supply
A monetary policy tightening may reduce loan supply, especially if bank
health is poor. However, banks which have large holdings of securities and/or
can acquire loanable funds (e.g. by issuing market securities) can keep their
loan supply unchanged.
Degree of bank dependence A high share of bank loans in business financing and a large number of small
firms (which have less alternative sources of finance) would point to a
potentially strong bank lending channel.
Credit view: Balance-sheet channel
Size structure of firms Smaller firms, more prone to suffer from information asymmetries, are likely
to experience a larger increase in the external finance premium (the difference
in the cost of external versus internal finance).
Use of collateral A monetary tightening that reduces the value of collateral will have a stronger
effect where collateral is more extensively used.
Firms’ leverage Firms in financial distress (e.g. measured by a high ratio of interest payments
over operating income), are more likely to suffer from the negative cash-flow
impact of higher interest rates. A high leverage ratio may be an indicator of
financial distress. On the other hand, it may also suggest ease of financing.
Efficiency of legal system
and contract enforcement
Credit rationing is more likely in countries with inefficient legal systems and
weak enforcement of contracts. In such cases, a low level of outstanding
credit would suggest liquidity constraints.9
2. Interest rate and exchange rate channels
With sticky prices, an increase in nominal interest rates causes a rise in the real interest rate.
The resulting increase in the cost of capital reduces investment spending (fixed and
inventory) and households expenditure on housing and durable goods3. If the interest rate rise
causes an appreciation in the real exchange rate, net exports fall. Higher interest rates also
affect consumption by (i) changing the disposable income of lenders and borrowers and (ii)
lowering households wealth (assuming that the prices of real and financial asset are
negatively related to interest rates). The breakdown of these negative demand impulses into
prices and output responses depends on the slope of the short-term and long-term aggregate
supply curve, in turn a function of price and wage-setting mechanisms4.
The main elements shaping the interest rate channel are likely to be (Table 1): the
transmission of changes in policy interest rates to market and bank lending interest rates; the
structure of production; the degree of wage and price flexibility, which is determined by the
working of goods and labour markets; sectoral balance-sheets, which delimit the scope for
income and wealth effects; housing market institutions, which influence the response of
house price respond to changes in interest rates. For the exchange rate channel, the key
indicator is the degree of extra-euro area openness. The remainder of this section discusses
the extent and consequences of differences along these dimensions across eight EU countries.
2.1 Interest rate pass-through
Euro area countries share the same money market and the same yield curve. However,
national banking sectors continue to be segmented, and there is evidence of a differential
3 Concerning the response of investment to the real cost of capital, opinions differ markedly. For instance,
Taylor (1995) claims that there is substantial evidence of the sensitivity of investments to the real interest
rate, while Bernanke and Gertler (1995) assert than the most common finding in empirical studies is that
“non-neoclassical factors, for instance ‘accelerator’ variables such as lagged output, sales or cash flow -
have the greatest impact on spending.”.
4 Another view emphasises the supply–side impact of monetary policy through the a so-called ‘cost-channel’
of transmission, see e.g. Barth III and Ramey (2000). The cost channel treats increases in nominal interest
rates as increases in production costs for firms. Hence, a shock to monetary policy could be viewed as
shifting both the aggregate supply and demand curves in the same direction, leading to a large change in
output accompanied by small changes in prices.10
pass-trough from market interest rates to bank lending rates. E. g., Mojon (2000) reports that
the response of short-term credit rates to money market rates is significantly smaller in Italy,
Germany and Spain, than in Belgium, France and the Netherlands (Table 2). Taking into
account also estimates from previous studies, the pass-through to bank lending rates appears
more complete in Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. Signalling the peculiarity
of the mortgage market, the response of mortgage rates is generally much weaker than that of
other credit rates (almost zero in Spain).
In terms of their impact on the real economy, however, it would seem that these differences
in the behaviour of short-term bank lending rates should not be overemphasised. A first
consideration in this direction is that spending decisions on investment, housing and durable
goods are probably more affected by the level of long-term interest rates than by that of short-
term interest rates. A standard result from the literature on interest rate pass-through is that
long-term rates respond much more sluggishly than short-term ones to changes in policy
rates. Secondly, in the euro area one might expect a convergence towards a fuller and more
homogenous pass-through from policy to bank lending rates. This is because all countries
share a same – on average less volatile - money market rate, and it has been shown that the
pass-through from policy to bank lending rates is inversely related to the volatility of the
money market rate (Mojon, 2000). Thirdly, the growing competition between bank loans and
debt securities on the asset side (witness the surge in corporate bond issuance in the euro area
in 1999-2000) and between banks and money market mutual funds on the liability side, is
reducing banks’ margins for smoothing interest rates on loans and deposits. In addition, direct
state ownership of credit institutions is decreasing, and EU competition policy has started
tackling government subsidies to the banking sector. For these reasons, bank lending rates are
expected to react more quickly to market interest rates even in those countries where banks
have traditionally cushioned the impact of changes in interest rates on their customers’
borrowing costs. Finally, as the trend towards disintermediation proceeds, European
companies will be increasingly confronted with a more similar but also a more rapid pass-
through of changes in the macroeconomic environment to their funding costs. Compared with
loan markets where there is often a direct relationship between borrowers and lenders, in
‘impersonal’ securities markets interest rates typically adjust much faster.11
2.2 Structure of production
Production sectors that face an interest-sensitive demand curve – e.g. construction and
durable goods - are likely to experience a relatively larger fall in output following a monetary
restriction. Similarly, capital-intensive sectors would be expected to suffer comparatively
more from an increase in the cost of capital, and be forced to scale down investment plans
and eventually output. Recent empirical studies have confirmed these conjectures5.F o r
instance, Dedola and Lippi (2001), who examine the output response of 21 industrial sectors
in 5 OECD countries, find that heavy industries like machinery and transport equipment
respond to a greater degree to monetary policy than other industries. Besides the significant
cross-industry heterogeneity of policy effects, these authors also find a similar ranking of
industries across countries.
Table 2 reports the employment distribution by macro-sectors. Despite some differences, e.g.
a larger manufacturing sector in Germany and Italy and a larger construction sector in Spain,
at this level of aggregation the composition of output appears rather similar across countries.
However, Dedola and Lippi’s (2001) data on the manufacturing sectors of the four big EU
countries shows that Germany is relatively more specialised in durable goods production than
Italy, France or the UK. Levels of investment are generally higher in the six euro area
countries (between 19% and 23% of GDP on average in 1991-2000), than in Sweden or the
UK (16-17% of GDP).
All in all, these figures suggest a relatively greater sensitivity of industrial output to monetary
policy in Germany and Italy. Looking ahead, there are no clear theoretical or empirical
indications to predict a particular direction of change in the structure of output in the euro
area (Buti and Sapir, 2001). Krugman (1991 and 1993) has argued that the combination of the
Single Market and EMU would increase regional specialisation in Europe, thereby raising the
vulnerability to asymmetric disturbances. Other studies, however, have concluded that greater
regional specialisation is not a compelling development (European Commission, 1996a).
Moreover, even if higher regional concentration occurs, it would not necessarily imply higher
national specialisation. For instance, Fatàs (1997, p. 749) notes that "in the post-EMS period,
northern Italian regions display higher correlation with German regions than with southern
5 Ganley and Salmon (1997), Hayo and Uhlenbrock (1999), Dedola and Lippi (2001), and Peersman and
Smets (2001).12
Italian regions". In any event, variations in the composition of output would occur only
progressively over time.
2.3 Price and wage flexibility
In all theories of monetary transmission, the real effect of money rests on some form of
imperfect price adjustment, suggesting that differences in the degree of price rigidity are
another potential cause of asymmetric output responses. As labour market frictions are a key
determinant of wage and price flexibility, it is useful to compare national labour market
institutions.
Table 2 reports a summary indicator of the strictness of employment protection legislation
(EPL) compiled by the OECD. The EPL indicator is a weighted average of indicators on
regular labour contracts, temporary contracts, and collective dismissal. The level has no
direct economic meaning, but the ranking (amongst 26 OECD countries) is informative. The
indicator evidences the relatively lower degree of employment protection in the United
Kingdom, and it suggests that conditions in the other seven countries considered are fairly
similar (although the Netherlands and Belgium have somewhat less stringent rules than the
other countries).
The introduction of the euro, which at least for some countries represents a shift to a low
inflation regime, could lead to an increase in nominal rigidity, by favouring longer periods
between adjusting prices and larger wage contracts (Calmfors, 1998). On the other hand, the
completion of the EU single market, including the elimination of national currencies, might
bring about more real flexibility, hence diminishing the real effects of aggregate demand
fluctuations (Burda, 1999).
Indeed, progress towards a fully integrated Single Market implies a reduction in the
monopolistic power in national goods and services markets (although big players at European
level may emerge in some sectors with significant economies of scale), leading to a higher
demand elasticity for products, which in turn will translate into a higher elasticity of labour
demand. In addition, more cross-border mergers open up the scope for substitution with
cheaper labour and capital within the euro area. Both mechanisms tend to lower the ability of
national trade unions’ to monopolise the supply of labour. Furthermore, by eliminating
national monetary and exchange rate policy and restricting the room for manoeuvre for fiscal13
policy, the euro policy framework provides incentive for national trade unions to fully
internalise the direct link between wages and unemployment.
These considerations do not necessarily suggest that the euro will lead to a convergence of
national labour market structures. Current labour market institutions reflect national
preferences, which also define the scope and speed of labour market reform. Although the
euro represents an element of convergence as far as the formation of inflation expectations is
concerned, labour markets represent an area where there is a concrete risk of increasing
divergence. The better recent employment performance of countries which reformed their
labour market earlier and more deeply - like Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK -
is suggestive of how labour markets can diverge despite increasing economic integration.
2.4 Income and wealth effects: household sector balance sheets and national
housing markets
Income effect
With the exception of Belgium and Italy, in all countries considered the household sector had
negative net interest-bearing assets in 1998 (Table 2). Looking at net debt positions is
however not enough. To the extent that debtors have a higher propensity to consume than
creditors, the amount of gross liabilities of households is also (and possibly more) relevant.
Households debt was largest in the Netherlands (154% of disposable income), and above
100% of disposable income also in Germany and the UK. It was considerably smaller in Italy
(37% of disposable income) than in any other country.
The maturity of debt is also important. An interest rate hike reduces a household's disposable
income (and discounted wealth) more if its liabilities are linked to short-term interest rates, or
otherwise adjusted to quickly reflect changes in short-term interest rates, than if the interest
rate was fixed for the maturity of the contract. In continental EU countries, households
liabilities are constituted almost completely by mortgages, as the consumer credit market is
generally small. In France and Italy, interest rates in most mortgage contracts are entirely
fixed or pre-set for periods of several years (Table 2), protecting borrowers against
unforeseen interest rate rises. Conversely, in the UK, Sweden and Spain mortgage interest
payments appear to be mostly linked either to short-term market interest rate or to bank prime14
rates, which behave very much like short-term market rates. In Belgium, Germany, the
Netherlands, renegotiable rate mortgages are widespread6.
All in all, these data point to a comparatively stronger (negative) income effect in the UK and
Sweden. As for the euro area, Mojon (2000), after having weighed the various items in
household and firms balance-sheets on the basis of the interest rate pass-through and
prevailing interest rate linkages, concludes that the income effect in Germany, Spain, France
and Italy should be similar.
Moreover, the euro monetary policy framework is contributing to reduce any existing
asymmetries. First, the development and integration of European financial markets is
loosening liquidity constraints, leading to a rapid expansion of private sector credit also in
those countries where the credit market was relatively less developed. Secondly, the share of
variable versus fixed rate borrowing is an endogenous characteristic of an economic system,
which depends, inter alia, on the past evolution of inflation and on the credibility of the
monetary policy regime (Britton and Whitley, 1997; Arnold and De Vries, 1999). It is no
coincidence that variable rate financing is more widespread in countries – such as Italy and
the UK – with a history of high and variable inflation. The shift to a credibly low inflation
environment is rapidly modifying the maturity structure of public and private borrowing. For
instance, in Italy, the maturity of government debt, a sizeable part of households interest-
bearing assets, has increased from 3 to 4.5 years between 1992 and 2000. On the liability
side, the share of long-term fixed interest rate mortgages has grown from around 25% in 1993
to around 60% in 1995. Thirdly, the integration of European financial markets creates new
opportunities of financing for banks, including the possibility to expand securitisation of their
assets and to have more extensive recourse to long-term financing. This also increases the
scope for lengthening the maturity of bank loans.
Wealth effect
In 1998 real assets (mainly real estate) accounted for around half of total net wealth in
France, Italy and the UK, and for almost three quarters in Germany (Table 2). The size of net
financial wealth of households differed much across countries. Net financial wealth was
6 Almost all EU countries allow partial deductibility of interest payments from the taxable income of
individuals. This slightly reduces the negative impact of a rise in interest rates on disposable income.
Moreover, as for a given borrower income an increase in interest rates implies a greater default risk for the
lender, some countries impose limits to the maximum payment increase.15
largest in the Netherlands (above four times disposable income), Belgium and the UK (3.4-
3.7 times disposable income). It was close to 2.5 times disposable income in Italy and France,
and between 1.6-2 times disposable income in Germany, Spain and Sweden. A key
distinction between real and financial asset prices is that the latter exhibit a high correlation at
international level, which effectively poses a limit on the ability of domestic monetary policy
to influence domestic financial asset prices.
In terms of the composition of financial wealth, it may be noted that a large portion of
households financial assets in the UK and the Netherlands was made up of equity held either
directly or through institutional investors (mostly insurance companies and pension funds).
Total equity ownership is less widespread in the other six countries considered, partly as a
result of underdeveloped private pension schemes. German households hold less equity,
either directly or through mutual funds, than in the other countries (63% in 1998, compared
to, respectively, 107% and 131% in Italy and France). Households equity holdings were
largest in Belgium (173% of disposable income) and Spain (145%).
UK households appear the most exposed to potentially large shifts in their wealth. This is due
to the relative composition of their financial wealth and to the historically higher volatility of
real estate prices in the UK (see below). Empirical studies have detected a statistically
significant wealth effect on consumption from changes in share prices in the UK, the
Netherlands, and, somewhat surprisingly, in Germany, although much smaller than in the US.
These studies have not found a significant effect in France and Italy (IMF, 2000).
The situation is changing rapidly, however, as in recent years there has been a clear trend
towards an increasing weight of equity in total households assets in most European countries.
Although the data are inflated by the strong rise in equity prices, the change in wealth
composition is to a large extent attributable to a portfolio reallocation stimulated by the fall in
bond yields and the spreading of mutual funds and private pension schemes.
Housing markets
Because of its important macroeconomic role, the housing market has attracted special
attention in recent research7. As real estate typically becomes the largest component of
household wealth, variations in house prices may have a large impact on households'
7 See, e.g. Lea et al. (1997), Maclennan et al. (1998), Iacoviello (2000), IMF (2000).16
perception of their wealth and permanent income as well as on their borrowing possibilities.
In debt-financed home purchases, the disposable income of households is exposed to changes
in interest rates, unless the mortgage contract is at a long-term fixed rate. Furthermore, real-
estate collateral plays an important role in household credit and in company credit in Europe
and there is some evidence of investment sensitivity to property prices (IMF, 2000).
Maclennan et al. (1998) relate cross-country variation in the degree of volatility of house
prices to differences in housing and financial market institutions. In countries with high
transaction costs, low loan-to-value ratios, a small owner-occupied sector, a large proportion
of fixed-interest mortgages and a large tenure proportion in the private rented sector, real
house prices should experience relatively lower volatility. Where mortgage markets have
been liberalised already in the 1980s, as in the UK, Sweden and Finland, real house prices
have been more volatile, with the standard deviation of annual percentage changes ranging
between 7 and 15 percentage points, compared to around 2 percentage points in Belgium and
Germany and 7-8 percentage points in France and Italy.
Because of its housing market institutions, the UK is therefore most likely to experience
larger monetary policy effects on demand through the housing market than the other EU
countries. Sweden displays many characteristics similar to the UK, whereas France, Germany
(where home ownership is less widespread) and, especially, Italy, would in many respects be
close to the other end of the spectrum.
Although the euro is fostering stronger competition in mortgage credit, convergence in
housing market institutions across countries cannot be predicted: housing markets are shaped
by all sorts of direct of indirect state intervention – also reflecting varying social preferences -
and are not subject to cross-border arbitrage.
2.5 Exchange rate channel
Changes in the euro exchange rate affect euro area countries asymmetrically on at least two
counts. First, an appreciation of the euro will have a stronger impact on economic activity in
those Member States which export relatively more goods and services to third countries.
Second, euro area Member States in which imports from outside the euro area make up a
larger share of the economy will see a larger impact on the domestic price level, and a larger17
opposite impact on domestic real incomes. The latter mechanism tends to pull demand and
output in the opposite direction of the change in exports.
Exports to third countries are proportionally larger in the small open economies of the euro
area. They are around 30% of GDP in Belgium and 22% in the Netherlands (Table 2)8.
Amongst the large euro area countries, Germany stands out for its higher share of extra-euro
area exports, 17% of GDP, compared to 13-14% in France, Italy and the UK and 11% in
Spain. The corresponding figures for Sweden and the UK are 27% and 13%, respectively.
These figure would indicate that smaller countries, and Germany amongst the large ones are
relatively more exposed to exchange rate movements.
It should be noted, however, that because of the total direct and indirect import content in the
production of exports the actual exposure to extra-euro area exports is generally smaller than
indicated by the export-to-GDP ratios. Moreover, because the import content of consumption
is also generally higher in more open economies, these will experience a larger terms of trade
effect than less open economies. As this effect goes in the opposite direction than the change
in net exports, (i.e. it boosts real purchasing power when the exchange rate appreciates and it
reduces it when the exchange rate depreciates), it also tends to decrease differences in the
overall net impact of the exchange rate channel.
3. Credit channel
The ‘credit view’ emphasises the role of credit market imperfections such as asymmetric
information and costly enforcement of contracts, which strengthen the impact of a monetary
tightening on the cost and availability of credit. The higher cost and the lower supply of
credit induce a fall in inventories and capital equipment spending by firms, and in housing
and durable goods purchases by households. A distinction is usually made between a ‘bank
lending’ channel and a ‘balance-sheet’ (or ‘net worth’) channel (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995).
The bank lending channel emphasises the special role of banks in dealing with asymmetric
information. There are two conditions for the bank lending channel to work. First, a monetary
8 No data are available for intra- and extra-EMU trade in services per Member State. The estimates in Table 2
assume that extra-EMU exports make up the same share of services exports as they do for goods. This
assumption is consistent with data on extra- and intra-EU trade in services published by Eurostat.18
policy tightening, by reducing bank reserves and deposits, must limit banks’ ability to supply
loans. This is not the case when banks can adjust their balance sheets, for instance by selling
securities, or can obtain loanable funds by issuing instruments not subject to reserve
requirements, e.g. certificates of deposit or bonds. Secondly, at least for some borrowers,
bank credit and other debt instruments must not be perfect substitutes, so that a fall in the
supply of bank loans implies a reduced availability of credit. This is typically the case for
small firms and individuals.
In the balance-sheet (or net-worth) channel the impact of an interest rate hike is magnified by
the financing difficulties originating in the balance-sheets of firms and households. Higher
interest rates lower the cash flow and the net worth of firms, reducing their collateral base
and their creditworthiness. As a result, their cost of borrowing (whether or not from banks)
rise, not only because of the higher level of interest rates but also because of a larger external
finance premium (the cost wedge between internal and external finance). Adverse selection
and moral hazard problems are exacerbated by the worse financial position of borrowers and
may lead lenders to reduce the supply of credit9. The remainder of this section examines the
factors which are likely to determine the significance of the credit channel.
Loan supply
Domestic banking sectors differ greatly in terms of concentration, profitability and financial
strength (Table 3). Banks in the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden are more
profitable and stronger financially than in the other countries. Italy and France have the
weakest banking sectors. Despite these differences, it seems likely that in all the countries
considered the banking system holds assets other than loans that it can use to buffer any
shortfall in deposits following a monetary contraction. Possibly as a result of the availability
of such buffers, the practical relevance of the bank lending channel has remained
contentious10. In addition, EU banks can obtain loanable funds either on the interbank market
9 As stressed by Peersman and Smets (2001), these effects are likely to be stronger in arecession than in a
boom.
10 Giavazzi et al. (1999) do not find evidence of a significant response of bank loans to the monetary
tightening which occurred during 1992. Their analysis covers Germany, Spain, France and Italy. A typical
result from studies of the bank lending channel is that following a monetary tightening the supply of bank
loans to small firms and households decreases, whereas that to larger companies increases (e.g. Watson,
1999, for Spain; Saidenberg and Straham, 1999, for the US). This suggests that what counts is not so much
whether loans come originally from banks or are raised directly from the markets but rather the size
distribution of firms and other characteristics – e.g. weak legal and regulatory framework and contract
enforcement - which reinforce the extent and the risk attached to asymmetric information between19
or by issuing securities. The ongoing consolidation in the EU banking sector and progress in
financial market integration are further expanding these possibilities.
Bank dependence
In continental Europe, bank loans account for the bulk of non-equity liabilities of non-
financial companies, whereas they are around 50% of liabilities in the UK. Equity finance is
most developed in the UK but it is growing in the rest of Europe (Table 3). Differences exist
in the extent to which non-financial companies finance themselves directly on the securities
market. In 1998, the outstanding amount of non-financial corporate securities accounted for
just 1% of GDP in Italy and Germany, as compared to 6-8% of GDP in France, Sweden and
the UK.
Firm size
Empirical results corroborate the presumption that, following an interest rate hike, small
firms retrench activity by more than large firms and that they suffer from a fall in bank
lending (Dedola and Lippi, 2001; Guiso et al., 1999; Saidenberg and Straham, 1999; Watson,
1999). Table 3 reports the share of employment in firms with more than 250 employees. In
Italy and Spain small firms account for as much as 80% of employment. At the opposite end,
the corresponding figure for the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden is around 60%.
Collateral
Cross-country data on collateral is hard to come by. Table 3 reports data gathered by the BIS
(1995), which refer to 1993. Real estate collateral was more widespread in the UK and
Sweden, whereas collateral use was broadly similar in the other six countries. The
information on the typical loan-to-value ratio for mortgages in Table 2 can be used to
supplement these data. While in the UK the typical loan-to-value ratio in 1995 was close to
100%, it was only 40% in Italy. In the other countries, it was in the 70-80% range.
borrowers and lenders. Hence, these results seem more consistent with broader balance sheet effects, related
to a reduced creditworthiness of small borrowers and a diminished availability of collateral, than with a
constrained supply of bank loans as postulated by the bank lending channel.20
Leverage
Table 3 shows, for each country, the average leverage ratio and the leverage ratio of the
median firm. In terms of its influence on monetary transmission, however, the leverage ratio
can be interpreted in two contradictory ways. On one hand, it can be seen as an indicator of
firms’ borrowing capacity, hence suggesting that a higher ratio would be associated with a
weaker credit effect. On the other hand, it can be considered as a proxy for the interest
burden, in which case a higher ratio would be associated with stronger cash-flow and net
worth effects. Leverage was lowest in France and highest in the UK, with the other countries
having similar ratios.
Legal framework
A weak legal framework – i.e. one which gives little protection to shareholders and creditors,
no fully transparent company accounting rules and weak contract enforcement - sharpens the
moral hazard and adverse selection problems by increasing the loss value associated to any
given level of default risk. Indeed, the relative effectiveness and efficiency of national legal
systems is considered an important explanatory factor of the present configuration of
economic and financial structures (Cecchetti, 1999; La Porta et al., 1997). For instance, the
level of outstanding mortgage debt seems to be related to the rules for foreclosure and
repossession of collateral (Lea et al., 1997).
On the basis of the indicators in Table 3, Italy appears to have a relatively weaker legal
system, as a result of weak enforcement of contracts and shareholder rights. The UK grants
the highest protection to shareholders and creditors, but the degree of enforcement is below
that of some other countries. Sweden and the Netherlands also appear to have relatively well-
functioning legal systems.
Summing up on the credit channel
It is not obvious to draw conclusions on the credit channel. While a more developed financial
system offers lower funding costs and a broader range of financing sources, at the same time
the easier access to credit increases the reliance of economic agents on borrowed funds and
their exposure to changes in cash-flows and creditworthiness. Hence, the balance-sheet
channel might be relatively strong in Italy and Spain, because of the large number of small
companies and the comparatively weaker legal system, but also in the UK (and Sweden)21
because of the substantially larger amount of outstanding credit to households and firms and
the extensive use of collateral.
This is a different view from that of studies which have focussed on the bank lending channel
(e.g., Kashyap and Stein, 1997). These studies tend to conclude that the impact of monetary
policy would be stronger in continental EU countries than in the UK, essentially as a result of
the role of bank credit and the size structure of firms. However, the evidence on the relevance
of the bank lending channel is weak, as even those empirical studies which ascertain the
existence of such channel in either Europe or the US do not go as far as proving that it is
quantitatively significant.
4. Concluding remarks
The previous sections have shown that EU countries display large differences in economic
and financial structures, with the potential to induce heterogeneous output and inflation
responses to monetary policy. However, whether looked at from a particular perspective or in
more general terms, the differences across the six euro area countries considered (Belgium,
Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands) are of a lesser scale than those between them
and the UK or Sweden. While in itself this does not lead to a conclusion on the overall power
of monetary policy in the two groups of countries it suggests that the mechanisms at work
may be different.
Beyond providing a snapshot of the present situation, this study has attempted to distinguish
between those areas where one can expect national structures to convergence over time,
hence reducing the potential for asymmetries in monetary transmission, and areas in which
structural differences are likely to persist.
The biggest changes are undoubtedly taking place in financial structures, under the combined
effect of the single monetary policy regime and of the wider forces of globalisation and
technological change. These changes are blurring the traditional contrast between an Anglo-
Saxon ‘market-based’ financial system and a continental Europe ‘bank-centred’ financial
system. The degree of approximation of financial structures, however, will be constrained by
three obstacles: the varying effectiveness and efficiency of national legal systems; the22
difference in the institutions governing the housing markets; the different national choices
made, with regard to the funding of the pension system and the role of pension funds.
With the euro, asymmetries originating from the external side are by definition reduced (but
not eliminated), as for all participating countries any given monetary policy shock will be
associated with a smaller response of the effective exchange rate. As for economic structures,
while the single market and the euro are bringing about changes in the pricing behaviour of
companies and in the behaviour of social partners, there seems to be little ground to foresee
that these changes will reduce the existing cross-country differentiation in production
structures, labour market institutions and firm size.
All in all, although the cross-country heterogeneity in the effects of monetary policy could
reduce over time as financial structures become more similar and economic agents adjust
their behaviour to the new policy environment, it will remain to some extent a persistent
feature of the euro area, as in any other large monetary union. In practical terms, however, it
is probable that asymmetries in transmission will be a lesser concern, at least in the present
configuration of the euro area, than the issues raised by having the same nominal interest
rates in countries that are at different phases of the business cycle. Because of the unique
allocation of policy instruments in the euro area, however, developments in national
transmission mechanisms will need to be more carefully monitored by policy makers.
For the single monetary policy, an interesting development relates to how the various trends
highlighted above are changing the relative weight of the various channels of transmission.
The interest rate channel is becoming more effective under the combined effect of: a quicker
pass-through from policy to market and retail interest rates, resulting from the single
monetary policy and money and capital market integration; growing disintermediation, which
exposes debtors to the more rapid and more pronounced response of market finance than
bank lending to changes in official interest rates; and, stronger competition in the supply of
bank loans. The role of transmission through asset prices is also growing, as the ongoing
redistribution of households wealth from real assets towards financial assets, and in particular
towards equities, strengthens the wealth effect. Most of euro area trade being conducted
within the area, the exchange rate channel has smaller relevance than for any individual
Member State. As for the credit channel, with credit constraints being loosened as financial
market integration proceeds, the exposure of companies and individuals to debt is rapidly
growing and it may become a source of increased vulnerability to interest rate increases.23
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Table 2 (first part): Interest rate and trade
channels
Year B D E F I NL S UK Source
Response of bank lending rates to a 100 basis points change in the money market rate
- short-term loan rate - response after 3 months 1988-98 0.96 0.68 0.65 0.86 0.50 0.99 Mojon (2000)
a
- mortgage interest rate - response after 3 months " 0.26 0.45 0.07 0.34 0.27 "
- deposit interest rate - response after 3 months " 0.94 0.66 0.10 0.10 0.41 "
- short-term loan rate - response after 3 months 1984-94 0.99 0.45 0.30 0.45 0.69 0.96 0.74 1.01 Borio and Fritz
(1995)
a
- short-term loan rate - long-run response " 1.27 1.05 1.17 0.74 1.22 1.08 0.92 1.01 "
- short-term loan rate - response after 3 months ca. 1990-
94
0.95 0.36 1.00 0.53 0.72 0.95 1.00 "
- short-term loan rate - long-run response " 0.93 0.98 1.05 0.59 1.07 1.03 1.00 "
Production
Sectoral employment (% of total employment)
- agriculture 1996 0.7 1.4 3.4 1.7 3.7 1.7 1.4 1.2 EU Commission,
AMECO database
- industry excl building and construction " 22.0 25.1 22.1 19.2 27.2 17.1 20.0 19.1 "
- building and construction " 5.8 8.2 9.6 5.8 5.6 6.2 4.9 4.0 "
- services " 71.5 65.2 64.9 73.3 63.6 75.0 73.8 75.7 "
% of durable goods in total industrial production avg. 1970-93 57.7 48.2 50.6 46.0 Dedola and Lippi
(2001)
Total investment (% of GDP) avg. 1991-
2000
20.8 22.4 22.9 19.3 19.0 21.3 16.5 16.9 EU Commission,
AMECO database
Labour market
Employment protection legislation (a higher figure
indicates higher protection)
end-1990s 2.1 2.5 3.1 3.0 3.3 2.1 2.2 0.5 OECD (1999)
(rank in OECD) " 13 18 22 21 23 14 16 2 "28
Table 2 (second part): Interest rate and trade channels
Year B D E F I NL S UK Source
Households balance-sheet (% of disposable income)
Real assets 1998 N/A 429 N/A 271 238 (1996) N/A N/A 326 OECD (2000)
Financial assets, including equities " 436 271 285 320 295 568 260 447 Eurostat
b
- equity (incl. shares of mutual funds) " 173 63 145 131 107 120 84 89 "
- interest bearing assets " 101 30 5 8 68 14 16 7 "
- insurances and technical reserves " 45 72 30 73 33 307 79 242 "
Financial liabilities " 63 112 78 66 37 154 93 106 "
- short-term debt " 5 9 5 4 11 "
- long-term debt " 53 102 55 52 143 "
Net financial wealth " 372 159 207 253 259 414 166 341 "
Net interest-bearing assets " 43 -82 -55 -49 40 -140 -76 -90 "
Memo: households disposable income as % of GDP " 72 63 66 64 70 51 51 67 "
Housing
Tenure: owner occupied houses 1995 66 41 78 54 67 47 43 67 Mylonas et al.(2000)
c
Outstanding residential mortgage debt as % of GDP 1998 25 53 24 21 8 65 50 57 IMF (2000)
Outstanding residential mortgage debt as % of GDP 1995 22 51 22 21 7 60 51 57 Maclennan et al (1998)
- % of debt at fixed interest rate 1995 25 20 20 80 60 25 little 0 Lea et al. (1997)
- % of debt at renegotiable (more than 1 year) interest rate " 75 40 0 0 0 65 30 "
- % of debt at variable or reviewable (at lender's discretion)
interest rate
" 0 40 80 20 40 10 most 70 "
Typical term " 15-20 25-30 15-20 15-20 15 30 20-30 25 "
Typical loan-to-value ratio " 80 60-80 70-80 70-80 40 75 70-75 90-95 "
Trade (% of GDP)
Total exports of goods and services 1999 76 29 28 26 26 61 44 26 EU Commission
Extra euro area exports of goods and services " 30 17 11 13 14 22 27 13 EU Commission
(estimates)
Total imports of goods and services " 72 28 28 24 23 56 38 27 EU Commission
Extra euro area imports of goods and services " 30 15 12 12 11 32 19 15 EU Commission
(estimates)
Notes:
(a) The interest rate series are not strictly comparable across countries.
(b) For financial accounts. OECD for household disposable income.
(c) For Spain: Maclennan et al. (1998)29
Table 3: Credit channel
Year B D E F I NL S UK Source
Credit market (% of GDP)
Bank credit to the non-bank private sector 1998 77 118 88 (1997) 80 60 107 103
(1995)
120 Mylonas et al. (2000)
a
Private sector domestic debt securities " 46 53 8 (1997) 33 31 11 50 28 "
- Financial institutions " 34 53 5 (1997) 27 30 8 43 19 "
- Corporate issuers " 12 1/2 3 (1997) 6 1 3 7 8 "
Equity market capitalisation (% of GDP) 1998 93 48 51 (1997) 65 46 146 121 169 "
Banking sector
Concentration (share of assets of top 5 banks) 1997 57 17 44 40 25 80 90 28 ECB (1999)
Number of banks 1997 134 3578 416 1299 935 90 242 551 "
ROE (net income as % of equity) 1996 15.3 12.3 9.7 4.8 5.1 17.6 24.0 25.6 "
Financial strength rating, average (number of rated banks in
brackets)
1997 B( 7 ) C+ (29) B (12) C (27) C (21) B+ (7) C-C+ (5) C+ (30) IMF (1997)
b
Collateral
% of total loans to non-bank private sector backed by real
estate collateral
1993 34 36 33 41 40 36 >61 59 BIS (1995)
Firm leverage
total debt/(total debt plus net capital) - average 1996 51.4 52.0 53.5 46.3 52.3 43.9 63.1 Guiso et al. (1999)
total debt/(total debt plus net capital) - median firm " 58.4 61.0 56.4 49.1 62.5 63.7 60.5 "
Size structure of firms
% of total employment in firms with > than 250 employees 1994/95 27.4 42.3 20.5 34.1 20.1 39.4 39.0 43.1 EU Commission (1996b)
Legal framework
Shareholder rights (a higher figure indicates more rights) 0 1 2 2 0 2 2 4 La Porta et al. (1997)
Creditor rights (a higher figure indicates more rights) 2 3 2 0 2 2 2 4 "
Enforcement (a higher figure indicates stricter enforcement) 10.00 9.23 7.80 8.98 8.33 10.00 10.00 8.57 "
Notes:
(a) ECB (1999) for Spain.
(b) The rating is Moody’s Investors Service assessment of whether a bank is likely to require financial support from shareholders, the government, or other institutions.
The ratings range from A (highest) to E. As the coverage of banking systems is not generally complete, they are not representative of the credit quality of the entire system.Economic Papers*
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